Crafting security council mandates by Roland, Rich
Crafting Security Council Mandates 
 
 
“By entrusting a collective institution with safeguarding peace among nations, the States 
Members of the United Nations have indeed taken a decisive step towards the 
establishment of a true constitution of the international community.  Chapter VII of the 
Charter is the key element of that constitution.”i 
 
 
Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, the first Article in Chapter VII, states that 
“the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken … to maintain or restore international peace and security.”  In 
discharging this responsibility, the Security Council has vast powers.ii  Its ability to 
employ those powers turns on the political will of the international community as 
represented by the membership of the Council.  In half a century of practice the Council 
has been through periods when it was unable to form the necessary will to take action and 
other periods when the options open to the Council appeared limitless.iii  In the Cold War 
years, the common denominator for action was a very narrow field hardly extending 
beyond the fight against apartheid.  In the immediate post-Cold War years the Council 
took it upon itself to tackle problems as varied as humanitarian disasters in the horn of 
Africa, state-sponsored attacks on civil aviation, the establishment of international 
criminal courts, imposing peace conditions, organising national elections, reinstating 
elected national leaders and undertaking humanitarian interventions.iv 
 
In adopting resolutions mandating action, the Security Council is acting at times as both 
an executive and a legislature.v  It is a decision making body deciding on enforcement 
actions, peacekeeping missions, the imposition of sanctions or steps towards state 
building.  The decisions are couched in terminology that has a critical bearing on the 
particular action.  The terminology to devise limits on actions, assign roles to various 
international actors, and furnish the UN secretariat with its mandate is contained in the 
resolutions adopted by the Council and their accompanying documents.  Just as the 
Council combines both executive and legislative decision making elements, so does the 
terminology in its resolution flow from both political and quasi-legal considerations. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the way Security Council resolutions are 
crafted, in particular in relation to the democratization mandates laid down by the 
Council.  This will require an examination of the body of work accomplished by the 
Council in this field as well as an examination of the development of the terminology 
employed and the process of arriving at that terminology. 
 
 
THE BREADTH OF ACTION 
 
The volume of work of the Council in recent years suggests that the key developments in 
this regard have taken place since the end of the Cold War.  In the 43 years between 1946 
and 1989, 646 resolutions were passed by the Council at the rate of about 15 a year.  In 
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the following 13 years to 2002, the Council passed a further 808 resolutions at the rate of 
about 62 a year or four times the annual volume of work. 
 
In the past decade the complexity of the Council’s work has also increased.  Sanctions 
regimes have become more sophisticated, at times targeting non-state actors and 
occasionally dealing with individuals’ criminal responsibility.  The interdiction regimes 
have also become ‘smarter’, often focusing on arms embargoes but also incorporating 
difficult features such as the oil-for-food rules in the Iraqi sanctions regimevi or freezing 
of government funds in the Libya sanctions regimevii.  The most difficult and ambitious 
development in the Council’s work has been its attempts at state building.  Since the first 
attempt outside the Trusteeship system at taking responsibility for a territory and its 
people in the case of Namibia in the late 70s, which itself only entered the 
implementation stage at the end of the Cold War, the Council has spent the last decade 
grappling with a score of situations on four continents while attempting to build or 
rebuild states traumatized by war, genocide or foreign occupation. 
 
While each of the situations is clearly sui generis flowing from their unique combinations 
of history and geography, the common aspect of the UN’s work in these situations is the 
multiplicity of objectives to be achieved.  Whereas the few arms embargoes of the Cold 
War years basically required member states of the UN to undertake not to trade arms with 
the country or entity the subject of the embargo, the recent interventions require the UN 
itself to take the front line role.  That role may incorporate an interdiction regime but is 
likely to include many other aspects.  There is often a requirement for monitoring the 
implementation of a peace agreement including separation of forces agreements, 
cantonment and storage of weapons.  There may also be a complicated logistical process 
of food delivery in a humanitarian emergency.  The security situation may not be fully 
resolved at the time of the UN intervention thus requiring a strong military component.  
To add to these complicated logistical exercises one must also often add a difficult 
sociological exercise of capacity building for institutions to take over key governance 
activities.  And one of the most common and visible of these governance activities is the 
holding of elections, at times in the form of an act of self-determination and at times as a 
means of determining the political choice to govern the country as a critical initial step in 
the state building process.  The multiple objectives are expressed in a mandate and the 
mandate is part of or authorised by the key Security Council resolution triggering an 
intervention. 
 
The table below lists the ‘state building’ situations the Council has faced.  The single 
resolution listed for each situation is perhaps open to misinterpretation.  The Council 
often returned repeatedly to the various situations to consider developments and debate 
options.  The resolutions listed are the first or key mandates for state building in each 
case.  Where two resolutions are listed, the Council significantly altered or extended the 
mandate.  The Secretary-General’s reports listed in the table are the documents before the 
Council when considering the intervention.  This chapter will draw mainly on these 
examples to examine the democratization element in those mandates. 
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MANDATES CONTAINING DEMOCRATISATION  
OR STATE BUILDING ASPECTS 
    
SITUATION MANDATE YEAR S-G’s REPORT 
Namibia SCRs 431& 435 1978 S/12636 
Namibia -implementation SCR632 1989 S/20412 
Western Sahara SCR690 1991 S/22464 
El Salvador SCRs 693& 832 1991/93 S/22494 
Croatia SCR743 1992 S/23592 
Cambodia SCR745 1992 S/23613 
Angola SCR747 1992 S/23671 
Mozambique SCR797 1992 S/24982 
Somalia SCR814 1993 S/25354 
Liberia SCR 866 
SCR1020 
1993 
1995 
S/26422 
S/1995/881 
Haiti SCR867 1993 S/26480, S/26352 
Rwanda SCR997 1995 S/1995/457 
Bosnia-Herzegovina SCR1035 1995 S/1995/1031 
Croatia-Eastern Slavonia SCR1037 1996 S/1995/1028 
Angola - consolidation SCR1118 1997 S/1997/438 
Central African Republic SCR1159 
SCR1230 
1998 
1999 
S/1998/148 
S/1999/98 
Sierra Leone SCR1181 1998 S/1998/486 
Kosovo SCR1244 1999  
East Timor SCR1272  
SCR1410 
1999 
2002 
S/1999/1024 
S/2002/432 
Congo (DRC) SCR1291 2000 S/2000/30 
Afghanistan SCR1378 2001  
 
 
LAW OR POLITICS? 
 
Straddling the executive and legislative divide, the resolutions of the Security Council 
tend to be the product of both law and politics.  The Council is the ultimate political 
organ of the UN.  Its very composition and voting method are designed to reflect a 
certain world order and to accommodate a certain global balance of power.viii  One of the 
great challenges facing the Council is that the changing nature of the world order in the 
post-Cold War era is raising fundamental political questions about the composition and 
voting methods of the Council.  It comes as little surprise that the Council would employ 
political solutions in its decision-making.ix 
 
At the same time, the Council is aware that there is a need for a certain level of 
consistency in its work.  While not bound by any concept of legal precedent, the 
Council’s will nevertheless needs to be conveyed by recourse to terminology that should 
have clear meaning to both the parties involved in the situation and the implementers of 
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the decision.  This calls for great care in the terminology employed and for use of 
processes analogous to those used by law-making bodies. 
 
The result is a hybrid system of law and politics.  At times the identical formulation is 
used to convey the identical decision, but at other times fine distinctions are employed in 
terminology either to distinguish the resulting decision from previous ones or simply to 
hint at a certain result where the necessary political will may not be present. 
 
Some formulations are necessary to trigger certain effects.  The Council will invariably 
utilise the term “acting under Chapter VII of the Charter” or refer to certain Articles of 
Chapter VII where it wishes its decision to have mandatory effect.x  Because the Charter 
arms the Council with this power only in certain circumstances, the resolution has a 
recitation of one of the three broad triggering circumstances: a threat to the peace, a 
breach of the peace, and an act of aggression.xi  The formulation most commonly used is 
a determination that certain developments constitute “a threat to international peace and 
security.”  This formulation covers the broadest fact situations and requires less by way 
of supporting argumentation than does a determination that there has been a breach of the 
peace.  However, where the breach of the peace is glaring, as in Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait, the Council did employ the language of “breach of the peace.”xii  The Council 
has never determined in its resolutions that there has been an “act of aggression.”  This is 
probably because the concept of “breach of the peace” is sufficiently broad to cover an 
“act of aggression” and also because the exact definition of an act of aggression is not 
fully clear even though a 1974 General Assembly resolution attempted to settle a 
definition of aggression.xiii 
 
The legal power of a phrase in a Council resolution and the politics behind that phrase 
was never better demonstrated than in the crafting of Resolution 678 of 29 November 
1990, which authorised the use of force against Iraq.  Yet the resolution did not actually 
use the term ‘use of force’, instead it employed the phrase ‘all means necessary’.  Noted 
journalist Bob Woodward has described the process of arriving at this phrase in detail.xiv  
The terminology of the draft resolution was the subject of over 200 meetings held by 
Secretary of State James Baker with foreign ministers and heads of state but the key 
phrase was finally agreed upon in a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze who initially rejected recourse to the term ‘use of force.’  While the Soviet 
leadership accepted the concept of using force to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, 
they preferred to employ a euphemism to authorise it.  Five different formulations were 
tried before the ‘all necessary means’ language was finalised.  To cement the meaning of 
the phrase, it was agreed that Baker, in his coincidental role as rotating Chair of the 
Council in November 1990, would describe the intent of the phrase to include the use of 
force.  If there were no disagreement, this would make the meaning of the phrase open to 
no other interpretation.  Once the meaning of the phrase was accepted by the Council to 
authorise the use of force, it was used again on several subsequent occasions where this 
meaning was required. 
 
The use of this language brings into stark relief the more equivocal language used in 
Resolution 1441 of 2003 where the threat against Iraq is contained in the phrase ‘it will 
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face serious consequences.’  Whereas some leaders have argued that this is equivalent to 
an authorisation of use of forcexv, it is noteworthy that the same process of examining the 
accompanying statements made by the United States representative does not necessarily 
lead to this conclusion.  In the United States statement after the vote on UNSCR 1441, 
Ambassador Negroponte specifically accepted that the resolution contained “no ‘hidden 
triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with the use of force.”xvi 
 
This raises the question of the consistence of usage of language by the Council and what 
can be drawn from that usage. The evolution of language authorising action is shown in 
the following tablexvii, which tends to reinforce the consistency of employment of the ‘all 
necessary means’ language when the Council is authorising use of force as compared to 
the situations when it is employing the ‘serious consequences’ language.  A possible 
distinction could be made whereby the ‘serious consequences’ language is seen as 
threatening the use of force as opposed to authorising it. 
 
 
Situation Resolution Year Authorising Terminology 
Korea 83 1950 “assistance as may be necessary to repel the 
armed attack” 
Rhodesia 
(sanctions) 
221 1966 “the use of force if necessary” 
Iraq 678 1990 “all necessary means” 
Somalia 794 1992 “all necessary means” 
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
781 - no fly zone
836 - safe zones 
1031 - peace agr. 
1992 
1993 
1995 
“all measures necessary” 
“necessary measures, including use of force”
“all necessary means” 
Haiti 940 1994 “all necessary means” 
Albania 1101 1997 “ensure the security and freedom of 
movement of the personnel of the force” 
Central 
African 
Republic 
1125 
1136 
1997 
1997 
“ensure the security and freedom of 
movement of their personnel” 
Iraq 1154 1998 “any violation would have severest 
consequences” 
East Timor 1272 1999 “all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate” 
Iraq 1441 2003 “Iraq will face serious consequences” 
 
The political nature of the Council’s decisions is quite clear.  The use of accompanying 
statements to elaborate on the meaning of the resolution resembles the method of treaty 
interpretation whereby if the meaning of certain words cannot be understood through 
their ordinary and natural meaning, the records of the negotiating conference may be 
referred to as a guide to the meaning of the words under review. 
 
Another example of the hybrid political and legal effect of Council resolutions can be 
found in the use of legal sounding terms that have weighty political impact.  Resolution 
731 (1992) took measures to bring to justice the terrorists who destroyed a civilian 
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aircraft over Lockerbie.  The resolution directed its actions against Libya.  A Libyan 
agent has subsequently been convicted for his involvement in the attack on the 
aircraft.xviii  But the original resolution linked the action to Libya by noting that 
investigations “implicate officials of the Libyan Government.”  The resolution used this 
quasi-legal term to put political pressure on Libya to accept the eventual court 
proceedings that proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
 
WHO HOLDS THE PEN? 
 
Mandates are normally written into Security Council resolutions.  Upon adoption by the 
Council, the mandate provides the direction, guidelines and limits of the mission the UN 
is undertaking.  If adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, as are most mandates having 
democratisation as one of the key objectivesxix, the terms of the mandate become the 
critical words establishing the legality of the UN’s subsequent actions.  The question of 
who drafts the resolutions thus becomes an important element in determining objectives 
and intentions. 
 
As with so many issues concerning the Security Council, it is necessary to draw a line 
between the Cold War and the post-Cold War work of the Council.  It is only in the latter 
period that the Council could be said in any sense to be acting in a collegial fashion and 
thus using methodology appropriate to that method.  Remnants of the Cold War 
methodology may remain insofar as China is concerned because while insisting on being 
consulted closely, China does not engage as actively in the drafting process as the other 
permanent members.xx  Leaving aside therefore the dominant fissure of the Cold War era, 
the drafting process can be viewed in terms of a number of tensions within the Council’s 
work methods.xxi 
 
 
National or collective responsibility for drafting resolutions? 
 
While the Council ultimately takes collective responsibility for its resolutions, the almost 
invariable practice is that responsibility for the first draft of that resolution falls to one 
country.  This is for reasons both of politics and practicalities.  Clearly drafting in 
committee is not an efficient method of work unless that committee has a coherent first 
draft before it.  Politically, it is usually a delegation closely involved in the issues before 
the Council that will undertake the drafting process. 
 
Political proximity to an issue might emerge through one or more of several factors.  
Proximity and membership of the same geographic group as the subject country or 
countries may often be the determining factor.  Past or present alliance or other close 
relationship may be another factor determining which delegation will take responsibility 
for producing the first draft. 
 
Given the continuing nature of many of the troubled situations before the Council, there 
has been an increasing tendency informally to designate a particular group of countries to 
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oversee certain situations.  These ‘contact groups’ or ‘core groups’ or simply ‘friends’ 
maintain a close watch on the situation and when drafting work is required, designate one 
of their number to undertake it.  The following comments draw on Teixeira, who lists 
seventeen such contact groups currently operating in the Security Council.xxii  Where the 
matter is of the highest political importance such as was the case with Iraq before the 
2003 war, the five permanent members consult among themselves.  In certain regional 
situations the core group is constituted by a small group of most interested countries 
whether or not they happen to be currently members of the Security Council.  
Accordingly, the East Timor ‘core group’ comprises the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Portugal, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and the responsibility for 
preparing the first draft of Council resolutions and decisions falls on one or other of the 
two permanent members.  Where one of the permanent members has a particular interest 
in a situation, such as Russia’s interest in Abkhazia (Georgia) it plays the main role but 
four other countries, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Germany have 
constituted themselves as ‘friends of the Secretary-General’ and attempt to have a 
moderating influence on Moscow and Tbilisi. 
 
The pragmatic nature of these arrangements can be seen in the fact that in relation to the 
long standing issue of Western Sahara, although there is a ‘group of friends’ comprising 
the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Russia, the main influence including 
over the drafting process is exercised by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, 
Mr James Baker, former United States Secretary of State. 
 
The result of these arrangements is to combine the necessity for collective engagement 
and responsibility with the efficiency of individual drafting of the base document. 
 
 
P5 dominance or E10 influence? 
 
An examination of the contact group process quickly demonstrates the dominant role of 
the permanent members (P5).  One of the permanent members tends to take the lead role 
in virtually all the groups.  The United States, for example, participates in 14 of the 17 
groups.  The dominance of the P5 is largely a function of the veto power they wield.  
Having a far more valuable vote than the elected members (E10) of the Council translates 
into far broader influence over decision-making. 
 
But there are reasons beyond the veto.  Security Council processes and politics are not 
easy to master.  The issues are such that they involve not only diplomats but also 
ministers and heads of government or state.  The E10 are placed in the role of 
enthusiastic amateurs when compared with the P5 hard-bitten professionals.  The P5 have 
seen the elected members come and go and there is a natural tendency to concert more 
closely with fellow permanent members.  The P5 therefore have the advantage of 
continuity, mastery over process, broad diplomatic networks on which to draw and the 
capacity to exert political, economic and military influence. 
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There is often resentment among the E10 with what certain members may see as the 
high-handedness of the P5.xxiii  The criticism usually is a variation on the problem of lack 
of consultation with the E10.  The tendency to seek consensus decision within the 
Council tends to put a premium on the P5 reaching agreement first with the E10 then 
falling into line.  This tends to establish as the key decision-making issue whether any of 
the P5 is prepared to veto a resolution.  Rarely is decision-making on resolutions 
dependent on the availability of the 9 votes in favour required under Article 27 of the 
Charter.  Yet the bitter debates concerning a second resolution on Iraq in 2003 turned at 
times on whether the United States and the United Kingdom could attract the nine votes 
necessary to necessitate a veto from one or more of the other P5.  In this tricky situation 
the E10 were far less comfortable, with Chile pleading to the P5 in effect to return to their 
normal hegemony over Security Council affairs.xxiv 
 
This episode demonstrates the essentiality of P5 involvement and concertation in the 
Security Council’s affairs for the Security Council to be effective under current 
conditions.  P5 dominance is a reflection of global politics, though it may not be a perfect 
reflection.  It therefore stands to reason that the P5 will have the most decisive influence 
on the shape and text of the Council’s resolutions and decisions, including their state-
building and democratization mandates. 
 
 
Is the UN Secretary-General an equal actor in the process? 
 
Any discussion with senior figures in the UN secretariat will elicit self-deprecating 
comments that the Secretary-General and his staff are the mere servants of the 
organisation and that on matters of peace and security the secretariat simply follows the 
instructions of the Security Council.  This deference is politically understandable but 
does not reflect accurately on the relationship between the secretariat and the Council. 
 
It goes without saying that the Council and in particular its permanent members wield a 
level of political and military might which the Secretary-General and his handful of staff 
cannot in any way match.  After all, while the General Assembly formally appoints the 
Secretary-General, it is the Council that nominates and has the decisive say in the 
appointment.xxv  This is true of the original appointment and perhaps the permanent 
members have an even greater weight in the reappointment of the Secretary-General for a 
possible second and final term after which they lose their influence through that power of 
reappointment.  It is also true that the Secretary-General has no vote or veto in the 
Council and has no option but to accept the mandates handed down by the Council.  The 
Charter nevertheless envisages that the Secretary-General is more than a mere servant of 
the members because he has been given the power independently to draw matters to the 
Security Council’s attention.xxvi  Yet even in this case, the Charter suggests that the 
formal role is more that of a messenger than that of an actor in the political process. 
 
But on this issue, reality belies formality.xxvii  The table above of the twenty key 
democratisation mandates contains a column on the relationship of the resolution to a 
report by the Secretary-General.  In these 20 situations, 18 refer to such a report or 
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reports.  The reports do not normally flow from the Secretary-General’s personal 
initiative.  The Security Council usually requests them but the baton is then clearly 
passed to the secretariat to fashion recommendations to resolve the situation under 
review.  The secretariat’s involvement may not always be as the principal external 
mediating force.  But the presence of the Secretary-General or his representative either as 
principal mediator or as providing legitimacy to a regional or other mediating process is 
nevertheless critical to the eventual shape of the international response to the situation.  
The reports tend therefore to be a key means of shaping the Council’s decision-making.  
In recent years the reports have become more detailed and constructive to the point that 
in several resolutions the Security Council has considered it sufficient to approve the 
report and adopt its recommendations as the mandate for the intervention.xxviii 
 
The table also notes two situations in which the mandate setting resolution does not refer 
to a report by the Secretary-General – Resolutions 1244 and 1378 on Kosovo and 
Afghanistan respectively.  In both cases the mandate is drawn from annexes to the 
resolution that are not UN reports.  In the Kosovo case, the intervention was by NATO 
with the UN scrambling to keep up.  The intervention was authorised by the Security 
Council retrospectively and the mandate flowed from previous political negotiations, in 
particular the Rambouillet Agreement.  The UN played a legitimising role rather than a 
leadership role and the involvement of the Secretary-General in shaping events was less 
pronounced than in other cases under study.  The Afghanistan case, however, while 
flowing from the UN authorised use of force under the inherent right of self-defence in 
Article 51 of the Charter, also appears at first blush to be a case of minimal secretariat 
involvement.  The resolution, however, adopts a subtle means of allowing the situation in 
Afghanistan to progress through a transitional administration to a democratic form of 
governance.  While this situation does not have a mandate-shaping report, it has a most 
influential special representative of the Secretary-General in the form of Lakhdar Brahimi 
playing a key role. 
 
The Secretary-General is clearly a highly influential figure in the setting of mandates.  
He, his staff and his special representatives can often play a critical role in 
conceptualising the shape of the UN intervention, articulating it in reports and quietly 
negotiating it through the Security Council.  It would, however, be wrong to think of this 
process as separate from the deliberations of the Council.  The Secretary-General does 
not work in a vacuum.  Delegations keep in close touch with progress and offer their 
assessments and concerns as the process develops.  While the Secretary-General’s reports 
are his own for which he must take responsibility, their substantive provisions have often 
already obtained the tacit approval of the key members of the Council. 
 
 
Does the action take place in New York or in capitals? 
 
It follows that much of the negotiation and drafting of mandates takes place in New York.  
This allows for a certain body of expertise to develop that can build on common 
experience.  New York most often is the negotiating place for resolutions.  At times, 
delegates in New York will have considerable latitude and discretion in this process.  
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This is often a function of the size of the country and the time zone it is in.  Many small 
countries serving a rare term as elected members of the Council have little option but to 
arm their representatives with considerable discretion to participate in the negotiating 
process within the scope of broad guidelines set by capitals.  They often do not have the 
expertise, the experience or sufficiently timely advice of the issues to do otherwise. 
 
Foreign Ministries of course wish to involve themselves as closely as possible in the 
issues and the Foreign Ministries of the permanent members tend to be best placed to do 
so.  While most countries adopt the practice of having the drafting of resolutions done by 
their delegations in New York, it can certainly be the case that where the resolution is 
being initiated by a certain country, the first draft will originate at headquarters rather 
than at the New York mission. 
 
The time zone also comes into play.  Washington and New York being in the same time 
zone allows far greater scope for involvement by the State Department, the National 
Security Council or even the White House than for example by the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry, which is 12 hours ahead of New York. 
 
Another key element is how politically sensitive the issue under consideration may be.  
As noted above, Secretary of State Baker negotiated the key terms of Resolution 678 in 
face-to-face talks with his Soviet counterpart.  In the 2003 battle of wills as to whether 
there should be a new resolution enabling the use of force against Iraq, the key figures 
were heads of state and government with diplomats in New York playing out parts in a 
play whose script had been written on the basis of phone calls and press releases at the 
highest levels of government. 
 
 
IS THERE A MANDATE JURISPRUDENCE? 
 
In many ways this is the critical question.  Is there a coherent and iterative process that 
builds on the style and terminology of the previous resolutions to establish an 
understandable pattern?  Is that pattern understandable to the implementers of the 
mandate?  Is there a broad concept of precedence in mandate language?  The answer to 
these questions would seem to be substantially in the positive. 
 
One readily identifiable development is the growing complexity and detail of the 
mandates.  The mandate given to the UN in Resolution 632 in 1989 was to “ensure 
conditions in Namibia which will allow the Namibian people to participate freely and 
without intimidation in the electoral process under the supervision and control of the 
United Nations leading to early independence of the Territory.”  The relative simplicity 
of the decolonisation situation in Namibia lent itself to a relatively simple and 
understandable mandate with a definite objective of independence.  Yet the rather vague 
injunction to the mandate implementers to “ensure conditions” that will allow the 
objective to be fulfilled would be progressively refined in future mandate-setting 
resolutions. 
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By 1997, dealing with neighbouring Angola with all its complications of internal rivalries 
and decades of foreign interference, the complexity of the mandate had increased 
remarkably.  The Security Council adopted Resolution 1118 establishing the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Angola and incorporating the mandate recommended by the 
Secretary-General.  The mandate has 25 separate elements divided into five major areas.  
An indication of the complexity of the operation can be gleaned by noting the many 
different operative verbs shaping the mandate, including: monitor, verify, promote, carry 
out, provide good offices, inspect, supervise, help develop, investigate and serve as focal 
point.  This is a quantum leap from the vague “ensure conditions will allow.” 
 
Another example of the increasing detail and complexity of the mandates can be found in 
the broadly analogous situation of the proposed self-determination referenda in Western 
Sahara and East Timor.  Neither represented a traditional decolonisation situation, both 
involved occupation by a neighbouring country rather than by a distant colonial overlord, 
and both situations were presented before the Security Council after considerable 
negotiations among the parties principal involving the Secretary-General.  Yet in 
Resolution 690 in 1991, the Council referred to the apparent political agreement and the 
Secretary-General’s report and then decided, “to establish a United Nations Mission for 
the referendum in Western Sahara”, elegant in its simplicity but avoiding many of the 
tough issues that have since dogged the process.  Eight years later the Council was far 
more prescriptive.  Resolution 1246 decided “to establish the United Nations Mission in 
East Timor to organise and conduct a popular consultation, scheduled for 8 August 1999, 
on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order to ascertain whether the East 
Timorese people accept the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special 
autonomy within a unitary Republic of Indonesia or reject the proposed special autonomy 
for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia…” 
 
A possible exception to the increasing complexity of mandates is the process being 
adopted in Afghanistan.  The mandate is based on the assumption that the international 
community’s role in the state building process must be subservient to local efforts given 
the weak state/strong society dichotomy.  The tactic is therefore to adopt the ‘small 
footprint’ idea by setting out the broad goals but leaving considerable discretion as to 
means in the hands of the Special Representative. 
 
The shape of the mandate has also developed in the post-Cold War Security Council’s 
work.  From the single sentence mandates in the Namibia and Western Sahara situations 
there appears to be an evolution in mandate drafting.  Resolutions in the early to mid-
1990s tended to spell out in greater detail the elements of the mandate.  The security 
aspects were invariably spelled out first followed by the technical assistance and 
humanitarian aspects of the mandate.  A good example is Resolution 797 of 1992 
establishing the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and approving 
the mandate terms recommended by the Secretary-General, which comprised six 
elements: four significant security-related tasks followed by the task to “provide technical 
assistance and monitor the entire electoral process” and completed by the task to 
coordinate humanitarian assistance. 
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A similar pattern can be seen in 1993 with the revised mandate of the United Nations 
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) where Resolution 867 sets out the security elements of the 
mandate first.  But an important development was the specific separation of the military 
and civilian tasks of the mandate.  The security assistance was to be provided by UNMIH 
while the civilian assistance was to be the responsibility of the International Civilian 
Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH).  This pattern of separating the different aspects of the 
mandate into its component parts was a practical innovation that assisted the 
implementers to discharge their specific responsibilities. 
 
By the time the Security Council was authorising large interventions such as those in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and in Eastern Slavonia in Croatia in 1996 it had become 
normal practice to separate the military and civilian tasks of mandates.  The practice was 
also followed in Resolution 1181 establishing UNOMSIL in Sierra Leone where the 
military and civilian components of the mandate were clearly distinguished. 
 
The pattern of compartmentalising mandates was greatly refined in Resolution 1118 of 
1997 which incorporated the Secretary-General’s recommended mandate comprising five 
elements: political aspects, police matters, human rights issues, military aspects and 
humanitarian aspects.  A further refinement can be seen in Resolution 1291 of 2000, 
extending the mandate of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUC), which specifically lists, in operative paragraph 4, the 
seven elements of the civilian mission as: human rights, humanitarian affairs, public 
information, child protection, political affairs, medical support and administrative 
support. 
 
The process of refinement with each mandate, building on the experience and learning of 
the previous mandates, amounts to a body of jurisprudence for both mandate drafters and 
implementers.  That process does not equate to a formula that must be slavishly adhered 
to.  Every situation will invariably present particular problems and issues that will require 
specific mandate language and formulations.  The MONUC mandate provides a good 
example of a task calibrated to a particular situation.  It does not fall back on the common 
injunction to hold free and fair elections but instead focuses on the preliminary task of 
state building by requiring close cooperation with the Facilitator of National Dialogue 
foreshadowed by the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.  The human rights objective is 
also carefully worded to give priority focus to vulnerable groups such as women, children 
and demobilized child soldiers. 
 
As with any political process, faults can be found.  The mandates can at times be seen as 
exercises in political expediency rather than the implementation of universal principles.  
A dominant underlying theme in the mandates, expressed openly in the early mandates 
and more subtly in later mandates is a concern to keep down costs.  The impact can be 
seen both in the size of the intervention and its duration.  There is accordingly a growing 
sophistication in the drafting of democratisation and nation-building mandates by the 
Security Council reflecting the body of practice that has been developed and 
incorporating the lessons learned from previous interventions. 
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MANDATE TERMINOLOGY 
 
In examining the terminology used in mandates one is also struck by a consistency of 
language.  As noted above, there is a necessary repetition in the verbs used to describe the 
action.  Many mandates require monitoring and verification.  Many require support for 
local capacity building.  Others require the implementers to advise, support or assist local 
processes in various fields.  The repeated use of the verbs facilitates better understanding 
of the scope of the particular mandate. 
 
Yet the crafting of mandate language is certainly a far more involved process than one of 
cut and paste from previous resolutions.  The art is to find a mandate that fits and that is 
achievable.  In searching for the right terminology, the first instinct, particularly of the 
international lawyers involved in the drafting process both in New York and in capitals, 
is to find a formulation that has meaning based on a certain use in the past.  For 
generalists or geographic experts involved it is also often a question of settling upon a 
term that has worked in the past, that has been used by the other members of the Council 
in previous resolutions and that has been previously approved by political leaders. 
 
An examination of the core group of mandates demonstrates that below the general 
similarities there are significant variations.  Resolution 1244 on Kosovo simply requires 
that one of the responsibilities of the international civilian presence shall be “protecting 
and promoting human rights.”  Resolution 1181 on Sierra Leone required the civilian 
element to “report violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.”  
Resolution 866 of 1993 on Liberia requires a “report on any major violations of 
international humanitarian law.”  Resolution 1118 on Angola contains three human rights 
objectives: contributing to the promotion of human rights, help develop capacity and 
“investigate adequately allegations of abuses and initiate appropriate action.”  The use of 
the term “adequately” is a reflection of the difficulty of taking action on the ground and a 
concession of the limits of the UN’s reach.  An example of the specificity of the mandate 
provisions on human rights can be found in Resolution 1020 which required UNOMIL in 
Liberia “to assist local human rights groups in raising voluntary contributions for training 
and logistic support.” 
 
Similarly fine-tuned formulations may be found in the mandates dealing with electoral 
matters.  The mandates in the early 1990s were relatively simple requiring the UN, as did 
Resolution 797 of 1992 concerning Mozambique, “to provide technical assistance and 
monitor the entire electoral process.”  In Liberia, Resolution 1020 shared the task of 
observing and verifying the election results with the then Organisation for African Unity 
and the Economic Community of West African States.  But in relation to the Central 
African Republic, Resolution 1230 of 1999 described MINURCA’s mandate in the 
electoral field as restricted to playing “a supportive role.”  In Eastern Slavonia, on the 
other hand, the UN was required to organise the elections and certify the results.  While 
in East Timor, conscious of the various devices employed by Indonesia over the years, 
Resolution 1246 spelled out in clear detail that “a direct, secret and universal ballot” was 
required for the act of self-determination. 
 13
 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of crafting Security Council resolutions is the 
articulation of the political result being sought.  When that result is clear, as in the 
Namibian decolonisation situation or the East Timor case after its clear decision in the act 
of self-determination, the Council can confidently work towards independence and 
democratic governance.  In Haiti it was assistance to the legitimate constitutional 
authority and the Security Council expressly stated in Resolution 940 (1994) "that the 
goal of the international community remains the restoration of democracy in Haiti and the 
prompt return of the legitimately elected President."  In relation to Sierra Leone the major 
demand made by the Security Council in Resolution 1132 (1997) was "that the military 
junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the 
restoration of the democratically elected Government and a return to constitutional 
order."  But in other cases where the people are still engaged in a form of state building, 
the terms require more careful elaboration.  In relation to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the objective is national dialogue.  In Somalia it was to rehabilitate national 
institutions and promote national reconciliation.  At times the best that can be achieved at 
a particular moment is to establish a process towards a final goal of democratic 
governance.  In Afghanistan that process is based on the establishment of an interim 
authority that has guidelines on how it is to operate.  But when the objective is unclear or 
unknown as in the case of Kosovo, the terminology cannot hide the confusion and the 
goal of “substantial autonomy” becomes more of a hindrance than a help to the 
implementers of the mandate.xxix 
 
 
PROBLEMS WITH MANDATES 
 
The foregoing account of the way democratisation and state-building mandates are 
drafted looks at only one aspect of a far larger issue.  The crafting of the mandate is an 
important part of the process but it is not in itself decisive to the success of an 
intervention.  The importance of the mandate is, nevertheless, beyond question. 
 
Then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peacexxx and its 
companion agendas for development and democracy offered “a comprehensive vision 
through which global problems might be more effectively met by global solutions.”xxxi  In 
relation to the large UN interventions, he notes that “the basic conditions for success 
remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in 
implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness 
of Member States to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including 
specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; 
and adequate financial and logistic support.”  Thus a clear and practical mandate was 
seen as one of six basic requirements for success.  The other five requirements are very 
weighty.  They encompass large issues of politics and implementation.  Yet the political 
and implementation issues have both direct and indirect impacts on the crafting of 
mandate language. 
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One of the political problems concerns the actions of other parties.  Mandates are 
constructed based on certain premises.  One of those premises is the coherence of the 
political agreement negotiated by the disputing parties.  If the agreements are negotiated 
in bad faith, or are beyond the ability of the signatories to implement, or are overtaken by 
subsequent events, the mandate that flows from them may be inappropriate.  Many of the 
major UN interventions are built on the foundations of a peace agreement: 
 
MINURSO Western Sahara UN Settlement Proposals 1988 
UNTAC Cambodia Paris Agreement 1991 
ONUSAL El Salvador Mexico Agreements 1991 
ONUMOZ Mozambique Rome Agreement 1992 
UNOMIL Liberia Further to Cotonou Ag 1993 
MONUA  Angola Lusaka Protocol 1994 
MINURCA Central African Republic Further to Bangui Ag 1997 
UNAMET East Timor New York Agreement 1999 
UNAMSIL Sierra Leone Lome Peace Agreement 1999 
MONUC Democratic Rep. Congo Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999 
 
One can point to examples of problems with mandates caused by problematic underlying 
agreements.  The timetables and tasks assigned to MINURSO turned out to be 
unachievable because of continuing disagreement between the parties.  UNTAC 
performed its mandated tasks but the refusal of Hun Sen to accept defeat in the elections 
and the formation of an unworkable coalition government would leave basic political 
problems unresolved.  UNAMET successfully conducted the self-determination ballot but 
its limited mandate did not foresee or prepare for the subsequent violence intended to 
vitiate the result of the vote. 
 
In Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali points specifically to problems with mandates that 
could in themselves trigger the lapse of the agreement of the feuding parties: 
 
“There are three aspects of recent mandates that, in particular, have led peace-
keeping operations to forfeit the consent of the parties, to behave in a way that 
was perceived to be partial and/or to use force other than in self-defence. These 
have been the tasks of protecting humanitarian operations during continuing 
warfare, protecting civilian populations in designated safe areas and pressing the 
parties to achieve national reconciliation at a pace faster than they were ready to 
accept. The cases of Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are instructive in this 
respect.”xxxii 
 
Another situation where the UN’s mandate may be hostage to the politics of outside 
forces is where the principal outside political force is not the UN itself but another 
country or regional group.  The best example of this is the Kosovo operation.  The UN 
was constantly playing catch-up, first in the process leading to the Rambouillet Accords 
and then after the humanitarian intervention by NATO forces.  It is a telling fact that the 
documents establishing the political context on which the mandate of UNMIK is based in 
Resolution 1244 are annexes to the resolution drawn from negotiations conducted outside 
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the UN.  In such circumstances the UN had no choice but to accept an unusual mandate 
requiring uncertain provisional steps “pending a political solution.” 
 
Other problems with mandates have been highlighted by the Brahimi Report.xxxiii  A basic 
premise of the report is “the pivotal importance of clear, credible and adequately 
resourced Security Council mandates” and it notes that “most (UN failures) occurred 
because the Security Council and the Member States crafted and supported ambiguous, 
inconsistent and under-funded mandates.”  The Brahimi Report refers to some of the 
political problems noted above including the problem of implementing mandates 
developed elsewhere but it also highlights other serious problems. 
 
One such problem is the Secretariat recommending mandates it thinks the Security 
Council wishes to implement rather than mandates it thinks it is in a position to fulfil.  
This can occur because of the apparent urgency to reach a compromise formulation 
making it expedient to paper over the anticipated problems.  These compromises can 
often lead to vague and ambiguous formulations that are difficult to implement and may 
thus compromise the integrity of the operation.  Formulations such as an instruction “to 
promote a climate of confidence”xxxiv or “establishing an environment conducive to the 
organization of free and fair elections”xxxv are too vague to be of much service to the 
implementers on the ground. 
 
Mandates need to be clear and practical but the political process of their drafting may 
lead to inconsistent obligations.  The UNMIK operation in Kosovo provides an example.  
Resolution 1244 contains a mandate requiring a raft of differing and slightly 
contradictory functions: the provision of transitional administration by UNMIK; the 
establishment of provisional self-governing democratic institutions for autonomous self-
government; a general injunction to work towards substantial autonomy and meaningful 
self-administration; as well as facilitating a political process designed to determine 
Kosovo’s political status as long as it is in line with the Rambouillet accords.  No wonder 
the Head of Mission confessed to being confused.xxxvi 
 
Ambiguity and inconsistency can be and often are cured by sensitive management of the 
situation by those on the ground but under-resourced operations are far more difficult to 
cure.  The problem of funding shortfalls is largely based on a decade long dispute 
between the United States and the United Nations over the American contribution to the 
peacekeeping budget.xxxvii  In view of the UN’s activism in the 1990s, peacekeeping 
budget blew out to be two or three times the size of the regular budget.  UN members 
have argued that the cost of the privileged situation of the permanent members is that 
they must pay a larger percentage share of the peacekeeping budget.  The US share was 
31% for the peacekeeping budget as compared to 25% for the regular budget.  As part of 
the US pressure to renegotiate these percentagesxxxviii, large parts of the assessed 
contributions were withheld leading to a US debt to the UN that at one point almost led to 
the possibility of a loss of the US vote in the General Assembly under Article 19 of the 
Charter.  The dispute has been largely resolved with the UN decision to lower the US 
assessed share to 27% of the peacekeeping budget and 22% of the regular budget.  But in 
the period of the UN’s state-building activism the lack of funds largely due to US 
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withholdings had a deleterious effect on peacekeeping operations.  The lack of funds also 
had an impact on mandates with drafters having to limit the scope of UN responsibilities 
to meet the available funds.  The most notorious example was the inability of the 
inadequate peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect ‘safe areas’.  The 
mandate only asked the peacekeepers to assess threat levels because the Security Council 
was not prepared to accept the cost of the 30,000-strong force requested by the Secretary-
General which would have allowed for a broader mandate to protect civilian 
populations.xxxix 
 
Inaction or half-hearted actions flowing from concerns about the cost of implementing 
mandates undermine the legitimacy of the UN interventions and thus have a corrosive 
impact on their effectiveness.  Clearly, funding is not unlimited for such interventions but 
at the very least the UN efforts should not be undercut by nations wishing to prove a 
political point through the withholding of their assessed contributions. 
 
 
APPRAISING MANDATES 
 
Having described the alchemy through which mandates are forged and having analysed 
problematic aspects of mandates, how can one conclude the study and appraise the 
process?  One obvious difficulty is that of selectivity.  By focusing on the interventions 
shaped by mandates, those situations that fall outside the realm of the possible in 
international politics also fall outside the appraisal process.  So appraising mandates tells 
us nothing about the fate of Chechnya or self-determination for Kurdish people or the 
future of Tibet. 
 
Focusing on the interventions themselves poses further problems of appraisal.  Is an 
intervention successful because fighting stopped or ceasefires were maintained?  This is 
often the media interpretation of events and thus a key component in shaping public 
perceptions.  But the fundamental question of the health of the polity that is the subject of 
the intervention remains unanswered if we look simply at the cessation of hostilities.  
Measuring state building is a difficult medium to long-term venture.  Perhaps the best 
political measurement is the satisfaction with the UN intervention by the parties principal 
including not only the leaders and factions within the polity but also the key actors in the 
international community such as the permanent members, the troop and civilian staff 
contributors and the neighbouring countries.  It is perhaps on this basis that the 1995 
Agenda for Peace claimed that in most cases the interventions have been “conspicuously 
successful” with Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique drawing 
particular praise.  Many commentators would agree with this general comment.xl 
 
The success of an intervention tells us that the clear and practical mandate was well 
suited to the result being sought.  But the success of the intervention is also due to the 
five other factors said to be critical: the cooperation of the parties in implementing that 
mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States 
to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; 
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effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate 
financial and logistic support.  So the mandate is only one part of the formula. 
 
Within the process of judging the intervention as a whole, mandates need to be appraised 
on their clarity and practicality.  A workable mandate will comprise mainly of action 
tasks that are simply described for the benefit of both the implementers and the subjects.  
Many of these tasks will be measurable in terms of performance, cost and timeliness.  A 
workable mandate will avoid vague compromise words that paper over essential 
differences and thus leave the dilemma unresolved and in the hands of the implementers.  
A workable mandate will have direction and closure.  The end point may not always be 
predictable but the direction should be clear and a point should be ascertainable where the 
emergency intervention ends and the regular processes of development assistance take 
over.  A workable mandate will have a defined division of labour.  This may be based on 
subject matter, on geographical area or on organisational competence.  One of the 
avoidable problems referred to in Agenda for Peace concern difficulties with 
coordination arising from the various specific mandates decreed for the agencies by 
discrete intergovernmental bodies.  The UN has the responsibility to coordinate its 
various inputs into a coherent effort. 
 
It is open from the foregoing analysis to conclude that the UN process of developing 
mandates for democratisation and state-building purposes have improved with practice.  
Mistakes have clearly been made but they have contributed to the learning and drafting 
process.  It would be unrealistic to demand that the vagaries of international politics be 
somehow eliminated from the process of decision-making and formulation of mandates.  
The power of the permanent members can be seen as a way of channelling realpolitik 
into the decision-making process.  For that reason alone, it would be futile to demand 
consistency.  Interventions that have a direct impact on one of the permanent members 
will not be treated in the same way as the more remote situations. 
 
To what extent should democratisation be a priority in the mandate?  The problem with 
asking this question is that democratisation competes with the reestablishment of security 
and the provision of humanitarian aid as the three major thrusts of mandates.  There can 
hardly be a process of democratisation without a generally secure environment and 
humanitarian aid in an emergency situation is clearly a priority for the subject peoples.  
The better way of posing the question is to ask whether sufficient priority is being given 
to the democratisation process.  That is a valid question because without a 
democratisation process it is unlikely that the polity can ultimately achieve a form of 
governance that will encourage reconciliation and favour long-term recovery socially and 
economically. 
 
The reply, inevitably, is yes and no.  Yes, democratisation has found a place in the UN’s 
rhetoric and in its mandates.  As one practitioner noted ruefully, even delegates from non-
democratic countries happily accept the inclusion in mandates of provisions for free and 
fair elections and support for civil society.  Mandates have become more sophisticated 
and the UN’s response is improving with experience.  There have been significant 
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achievements in half a dozen difficult situations and a willingness to build on these 
processes in the future. 
 
But there is also a negative response.  The problem is one of maintaining focus.  
Democratisation is not achieved by putting out fires, nor is it established by a single 
transition election; it is a long-term process requiring the patience to endure setbacks and 
to accept the slow pace of reform.  Each new crisis faced by the UN naturally detracts 
attention from the smoky ruins of the last fire.xli  The funds required for the long haul are 
often inadequate and the benefits gained initially are put at risk. 
 
A mandate can therefore only begin a process of democratisation.  It can put some of the 
basic foundations in place and set a certain direction.  Thereafter the process of 
democratic transition and consolidation is in the hands of many actors and political 
forces.  No more should be asked of the UN interventions in the field. 
 
 
 
 
 
Roland Rich 
Director 
Centre for Democratic Institutions 
Research School of Social Sciences 
Australian National University 
 
This paper will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming publication by United Nations Press 
entitled The United Nations Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality 
edited by Edward Newman and Roland Rich. 
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